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Abstract 
Categorical perception – perceiving stimuli as more discriminable if they belong to 
different categories than to the same category – has previously been found to be 
lateralized to the left hemisphere for colors (Gilbert et al. 2006). We tested the hypothesis 
that the lateralized categorical perception effect for color depends on active labeling of 
the relevant categories prior to the main task. In two studies, we manipulated explicit 
label activation and the category level (basic or subordinate) of the labels in a lateralized 
visual search paradigm. We predicted a stronger lateralized categorical perception effect 
when explicit labeling occurred before the task. We found categorical perception in all 
conditions, but the strength of the effect was not affected by the labeling manipulation or 
hemisphere. The results, particularly the lack of lateralization of the categorical 
perception effect, suggest that active language access alone may not be driving the effect. 
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Understanding the Nature of Online Linguistic Influence in 
Lateralized Categorical Perception 
Do linguistic categories affect perception? This question has been asked many 
times since Whorf suggested that habitual ways of speaking lead to habitual ways of 
thinking (Whorf, 1956). The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis that language influences thought 
was investigated through color research in the late 1960’s and beyond (Berlin & Kay, 
1969; Regier, Kay, Gilbert, & Ivry, 2010). The main argument was between the idea that 
there are universal, innate color categories, categories that exist in human beings 
regardless of language, and the idea that color categories are language relative, that they 
are different depending on the language the individual speaks. In this debate, some 
researchers took a ‘strong Whorfian’ view, often stronger than Whorf himself did, that 
language determines thought, while others took the ‘anti-Whorfian’ position that 
language has no effect on thought at all. Neither extreme was found to be fully correct 
(Regier et al., 2010). Language has been found to have influences on thought that are 
complex and subtle: The metaphors used for time in a language affect temporal 
reasoning, the class of noun used in a language to refer to an entity affects speaker’s 
object vs. substance attributions, and the grammatical gender of a noun is linked with 
stereotypical gender attribute associations (see Gleitman & Papafragou, 2005, for 
review). On the other hand, some thoughts seem to be universal regardless of linguistic 
knowledge such as the division of human locomotion into walking vs. running – many 
unrelated languages make the same division that reflects the structure of the world rather 
than a linguistically and socially constructed structure (Malt et al., 2008). This 
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accumulating evidence indicates that neither of the extremes is correct: Language does 
have effects on thoughts but does not underlie all thought. In the case of color, there 
appear to be universal tendencies for where labeled color categories are centered and 
where the boundaries between those categories lie, but languages create variations around 
the language independent optimal divisions of color space given the number of terms 
used to divide the space (Regier et al., 2010). The color debate needed to be brought from 
its original binary opposition to this new level of sophistication and subtlety to be of 
continued interest. 
In recent years, the language relativity question has been re-energized by the 
finding that colors are subject to lateralized categorical perception (Gilbert, Regier, Kay, 
& Ivry, 2006). Categorical perception is a phenomenon where items, substances or 
attributes from different categories are more quickly discriminated and reacted to than the 
same type of items, substances or attributes that are in the same category when all the 
items are of equal physical distinctiveness. For instance, for English speakers, a shade of 
color called blue and one called green are more quickly discriminated on a millisecond 
time scale than two equally physically distinct shades of color that are both called blue or 
both called green. When this asymmetrically happens for percepts processed in one of the 
hemispheres, the effect is called lateralized categorical perception (Regier et al., 2010). 
The visual search paradigm used in the Gilbert et al. (2006) experiments consisted 
of displaying an array of color chips in a circle around a central fixation point. Each trial 
had 11 color chips of one hue and 1 ‘oddball’ stimulus of a different hue. The participants 
were asked to indicate with a button push which side of the screen the oddball stimulus 
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was on while maintaining central fixation with their eyes. The reaction time from the 
visual display presentation to the button push was measured. This time period 
encompassed the processes of perception of the stimuli, deciding on a response, and 
motor execution of the response. Fixating the eyes on a central point holds the visual 
fields separate, allowing for independent processing of each visual field. The visual fields 
are initially processed by the contra-lateral hemisphere of the brain, prior to cross-
hemispheric processing. Gilbert et al. (2006) found the reaction times for the between-
categories color discriminations in the right visual field/left hemisphere to be 
significantly faster than the within category discriminations. No significant difference 
between the discrimination types was found for the left visual field/right hemisphere. 
This is the lateralized categorical perception effect referred to above. 
Since aspects of language are lateralized to the left hemisphere, Gilbert et al. 
hypothesized that linguistic category activation is the source of the lateralized categorical 
perception effect. Gilbert et al. (2006) provided further support that language is the 
source of the greater discrimination time difference in the right visual field/left 
hemisphere trials by using interference testing, a technique of adding a second task 
known to use a particular cognitive ability to the original task to see if it disrupts 
processing. They tested whether a spatial interference task, remembering a grid of black 
and white squares, or a verbal interference task, remembering a color word such as ‘red,’ 
would disrupt the categorical perception effect using a one-back match technique. In a 
one-back match design, the participant is given a new interference stimulus, the grid or 
color word in this case, at the beginning of each trial. The participant indicates whether 
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the new stimulus matches the previous interference stimulus. Gilbert et al. found a 
disruptive effect of only the verbal task, indicating that the categorical perception effect 
depends specifically on access to linguistic capacities in the left hemisphere, allowing 
them to conclude that online activation of linguistic processes was responsible for the 
observed lateralized categorical perception effect.  
The color lateralized categorical perception finding has been replicated 
(Drivonikou, Kay, Regier, Ivry, Gilbert, Franklin, & Davies, 2007). In the original 
experiment (Gilbert et al., 2006), there was no significant categorical perception effect in 
the left visual field/right hemisphere. In subsequent experiments (Drivonikou et al., 2007; 
Roberson, Pak, & Hanley, 2008), a statistically significant categorical perception effect 
has been found in the left visual field/right hemisphere though it is significantly smaller 
than the effect in the right visual field/left hemisphere. While not as neat as the Gilbert et 
al. (2006) findings, the replications continue to indicate that online language activation in 
the left hemisphere strengthens the categorical perception effect. 
Furthermore, developmental research has show that categorical color perception is 
actually lateralized to the right hemisphere in pre-linguistic toddlers (Franklin et al., 
2008). Using an eye-tracking version of the visual search task with more dispersed color 
stimuli, pre-linguistic toddlers had a stronger categorical perception effect in the left 
visual field/right hemisphere while toddlers who had acquired color labels had a stronger 
categorical perception effect in the right visual field/left hemisphere as was found in 
adults. The Franklin et al. experiments show that the lateralized categorical perception 
effect in adults cannot be due to a lateralized visual color focality sensitivity or some 
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other non-linguistic visual property of the stimuli that preferentially affects the left 
hemisphere. Learning the labeled color categories of a language appears to equal and 
overcome a natural sensitivity to certain color discriminations in the left visual field/right 
hemisphere. 
Habitual Thought vs. Thinking-for-Speaking 
In each of the experiments in the Gilbert et al. (2006) and Drivonikou et al. (2007) 
papers, the colors were labeled by the participants prior to completing the main visual 
search task. This was done in order to ensure that the participant’s idiosyncratic color 
boundary was the same as the pre-tested average color boundary for English speakers. In 
Gilbert et al.’s (2006) before-task labeling procedure, the participants were shown the 
four color hues multiple times each and asked to categorize them into blue, using a ‘b’ 
button push, or green, using a ‘g’ button push. In the Drivonikou et al. (2007) procedure, 
the participants were asked to categorize the colors into blue and green, or into blue and 
purple, with the colors of the before-task labeling being the colors of the condition to 
which they were assigned. Although these experimenters’ intentions in including the pre-
test were only to establish the participants’ color boundaries, it may have inadvertently 
had an additional effect. The before-task labeling process would have activated the color 
names in the participant’s mind and caused them to explicitly categorize the specific 
color hues by the basic color labels. Gilbert et al. (2006) argued that the lateralized 
categorical perception effect is a broadly defined influence of language on perception, 
whether it is directly on perceptual processing or on decision processes that follow the 
initial perceptual processing. They consider the finding to support the Whorfian 
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hypothesis that thought is shaped by language into habitual patterns, with the 
qualification that their results support it only for the left hemisphere, the language 
dominant hemisphere of the brain. However, by using the before-task labeling procedure, 
the researchers unintentionally ensured that the linguistic categories were active and 
engaged in the subsequent visual search task. Lupyan, Thompson-Schill, & Swingley 
(2010) showed that overtly labeling letters before a categorical perception task shifted the 
timing of the categorical perception effect forward, indicating that even for a domain very 
closely tied to language, overt labeling changes processing. Although the researchers 
were not particularly interested in the effect of pre-activating labels, the procedures used 
in the lateralized color categorical perception experiments have looked for categorical 
perception through a task in which linguistic categories are overtly invoked, rather than in 
tasks that may or may not engage linguistic categorization naturally. The conclusion that 
there is a habitual online influence of linguistic categories on visual processing in the left 
hemisphere is premature given the empirical evidence thus far collected. 
The idea that engaging language in a task might affect task performance is not 
new. Slobin (1996) put forth the idea that ‘thinking-for-speaking’ is different from other 
modes of thinking. While Whorf originally argued that the language an individual speaks 
causes habitual changes in the way he or she thinks regardless of whether language is 
being utilized in the moment, Slobin argued that it is when an individual is thinking for 
the purpose of speaking that linguistic influences would be present, based on the need to 
encode certain aspects of the world in order to produce grammatically correct speech. For 
example, if a language requires manner of motion to be described, the individual could 
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either always be thinking of how motion is being accomplished as a matter of habit in 
Whorf’s account, or could engage in thinking about manner of motion only when it is 
needed to form speech in Slobin’s account. Slobin’s theory suggests that thought 
(linguistically influenced or not) is context- and purpose-dependent while Whorf’s theory 
portrays thought as having an ingrained default mode that is determined by the language 
one speaks. In the Gilbert et al. studies, the participants were engaging their linguistic 
processing mode by labeling the colors before the main task. Even if participants were 
capable of processing that is not influenced by language, priming the color language and 
forcing linguistic categorization may have caused the participants to use a language-
based processing mode for the task. Naming the colors could create a color naming 
context in which the color names would be accessed during the visual search task. If 
Slobin is correct that context drives linguistic influence on thought, had the participants 
not labeled the color stimuli before the task, they may not have been prepared to use 
language related thought processes and would have had the possibility of using other 
valid non-linguistic thought processes.   
There is one experiment using color stimuli in a visual search paradigm that did 
not have a before-task labeling procedure (Roberson et al., 2008). Roberson et al. 
conducted a cross-linguistic experiment comparing Korean and English native speakers 
using a linguistic color boundary that exists in Korean but not English. This distinction is 
between yeondu (yellow-green) and chorok (green). Korean speakers showed the 
categorical perception effect for both visual fields with a stronger effect in the right visual 
field/left hemisphere, consistent with Drivonikou et al. (2007). English speakers did not 
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show a categorical perception effect in either visual field, as would be predicted by the 
literature on lateralized categorical perception since all of the stimuli belonged to one 
linguistic category for these participants. This finding argues against a universal, innate 
set of color categories that persist after language is acquired and for a language relativity 
account. This experiment tested a boundary that does not exist linguistically for the 
English speakers – there isn’t linguistic category information available to influence 
perception for half the participants, the half that spoke English and had no Korean 
language abilities. Since the participants were tested on a non-English boundary, the 
experiment does not allow for comparison with previous English language experiments in 
this paradigm, and there has been no experiment with Korean speakers in which the 
subjects label the colors before the visual search task that would allow for a direct 
comparison. 
The results of the Roberson et al. (2008) experiment also were not as clear as 
previous experiments. The full dataset showed the categorical perception effect in both 
visual fields for the Korean speakers with no significant difference in strength. The 
authors divided the participants in half by overall reaction time, and found the predicted 
results of the stronger categorical perception effect in the right visual field/left 
hemisphere only for the faster participants. The authors justified splitting the participants 
into slower and faster groups based on the idea that the data for the faster participants 
reflected earlier, more lateralized processing while the slower participants could have had 
cross-hemispheric transfer. The splitting of the groups into faster and slower participants 
could be reflecting processing differences other than the amount of cross-hemispheric 
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transfer; the faster participants could be spontaneously labeling the colors and activating 
their color categories while the slower participants were not. Without further evidence, 
the Roberson et al. results are not very convincing. If we find less categorical perception 
for unnamed categories when directly comparing them to overtly named categories using 
more controlled materials, the Roberson et al. results could be interpreted as a result of 
language activation levels rather than cross-hemispheric transfer. 
In short, linguistically based lateralized categorical perception is a newly 
discovered phenomenon that has not been fully investigated. Thus far, most experiments 
(Drivonikou et al., 2007; Gilbert et al., 2006; Gilbert, Regier, Kay & Ivry, 2008) have 
primed language prior to conducting the main task, then attributed the effect to habitual 
language. These researchers have shown that language can produce this effect when 
explicitly activated, but the pervasive habitualness of the phenomenon has not been 
tested. When language was not primed (Roberson et al., 2008) the results were less strong 
and clear.  In the present experiments, we will investigate the role of explicit language 
activation in the lateralized categorical perception phenomenon. 
Perceptual Processing vs. Decision Processes in Categorical Perception Effects 
Beyond the main argument of the current work described above, there is another 
current debate surrounding the categorical perception effect, lateralized and non-
lateralized. In the original article, Gilbert et al. (2006) raise two possibilities for the 
source of the phenomenon in regards to color. The lateralized categorical perception 
effect could be due to a change in basic perceptual processing or could be a result of 
altered post-perceptual decision-making processes. In the direct perceptual account, by 
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calling a particular color blue, the lexical-conceptual idea of blue interacts with the 
perceptual experience of the actual color hue in the perceptual system, creating a pattern 
of activation that is more typically blue than would be the case without a categorization. 
Participants ‘see’ the colors as more different than they physically are in terms of the raw 
perceptual system input, and as a result, distinguish the colors as different faster than 
when the colors are not influenced by a conceptual difference. In the post-perceptual, 
decision-making account, the influence of color labels on response times is based on 
linguistic information added independently from the perceptual information at the 
decision-making stage of processing that allows for reaching a decision threshold faster.   
Roberson et al. (2008) champion a version of the decision-making account with 
basic level perception and label activation co-occurring independently (see Pylyshyn, 
1999, for a comprehensive review of the theoretical position). According to Roberson et 
al. (2008), a certain amount of time is needed to accumulate enough perceptual evidence 
that the color chips are different shades of color and make the different/same decision. 
When the labels are different, the perception of the color chips activates the different 
labels, which allows the comparative perceptual process to be augmented with the added 
evidence of the linguistic processing. If the color chips have the same label, the perceiver 
would have to rely on the perceptual comparison to overcome the linguistic processing, 
which is providing evidence that the colors are the same linguistically. By this reasoning, 
the decision that the chips are different colors can therefore be made faster with the 
different labels than if they had the same label. Rather than the perceptual processing of 
the color being changed by the knowledge of color labels, the color processing itself is 
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the same with an additional, separate linguistic process occurring to help reach the 
‘different color’ decision. 
Lupyan and colleagues (Lupyan et al., 2010) champion a version of the direct 
perceptual account of the categorical perception effect. Rather than two separate channels 
of processing, perceptual and conceptual (with linguistic information being a subset of 
the conceptual), working independently and being compared at a decision-making level 
of processing, Lupyan et al. suggest that early in perceptual processing there is 
interaction between the top-down conceptual processing and the bottom-up perceptual 
processing. This could be realized as a cognitive structure involving cross-talk between 
the two systems or could be a feed-forward structure that has a perceptual/conceptual 
combination level prior to a decision-making level of processing. They do not believe a 
final decision-making level integration of the perceptual and conceptual information 
would be sufficient to explain the categorical perception effect in their tasks. 
The thinking-for-speaking view of lateralized categorical perception could 
potentially work in either model. In the decision-making level model, either the 
linguistic-conceptual channel of processing is strongly influencing the decision process or 
it is not. When language and the conceptual knowledge attached to language are not 
being accessed, very little output from the conceptual channel will reach the decision-
making level. Similarly, in the conceptual penetration of perceptual processing account, 
the conceptual system is not strongly accessed if labels are not activated. In a feedback 
version of the model, there is little activation in the conceptual areas allowing the visual 
processing to proceed uninfluenced. In a feed-forward version of the model, the 
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conceptual path in early visual processing would not be utilized, allowing the visual 
output to pass through a pre-decision-making visual/conceptual combination level 
unaltered. While the thinking-for-speaking model of lateralized categorical perception 
would most easily work within the decision-making model where conceptual information 
is easily separable from visual processing, it could be that the conceptual penetration 
model better fits what may be complex data, with relative intensity of conceptual 
influence being seen rather than an all-on or all-off scenario. Similarly, evidence of the 
habitual influence of language and categories on color perception would be more readily 
modeled by the interacting direct perceptual account, but could also work in a decision-
level account with the conceptual channel always ‘on.’ 
The data collected in the present experiments presumably reflects the interaction 
of perceptual and linguistic-conceptual processing.  We will discuss how the current data 
address the debate about the nature of the interaction, though we did not expect the data 
to conclusively differentiate between the two theoretical stances. 
Typicality Influence on Within-Category Trials  
 Typicality is a conceptually based phenomenon. Typicality is a product of the 
graded structure of categories (Barsalou, 1987) where some members of a category are 
considered to be better exemplars of the category than other members. Recently, Hanley 
and Roberson (2011) reanalyzed a number of past categorical perception experiments 
with color and face stimuli to examine the influence of typicality on within-category 
trials. The paradigm they looked at was two-alternative forced choice. One stimulus, the 
target, is shown to the participant followed by two stimuli side-by-side, the target and a 
  
  14 
distracter. The participant is asked to indicate which of the two stimuli on the second 
screen was a match to the original stimulus. The categorical perception effect is 
demonstrated in this memory task by a higher accuracy on between-category trials than 
on within-category trials. In this experiment, some of the original stimuli were more 
typical of a labeled color category than others. Breaking up the data by which stimulus 
was the target vs. distracter for the within-category discrimination pairs, a systematic 
typicality influence was found to be present. If the stimulus more typical of the category 
was the target, the participants performed only slightly less accurately than in the 
between-categories trials. If the less typical stimulus was the target, it was significantly 
less accurately identified than in between-categories trials.  They found that this pattern 
did not hold if verbal interference was added to the task. 
 Hanley and Roberson (2011) put forth an explanation for these effects that 
depends on linguistic categorization. The target as originally presented must be stored in 
working memory in order to compare it to the subsequent stimuli. If part of this storage 
process involves categorizing the item, the initial categorization could help or hinder the 
accuracy of the forced choice. For example on its own, a peripheral green may be labeled 
green. When presented again in the context of a more typical green, the peripheral green 
may be labeled blue rather than green. There would then be a mismatch between the 
categorizations for the peripheral color that would lend itself to more inaccuracy during 
the forced choice.  This would be less likely to occur with a good example of a category 
because typical category members are more consistently named and less affected by 
context. 
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 The present research did not use the two-alternative forced choice task.  However, 
in within-category trials, more and less typical members of color categories served in 
each of the stimulus roles, context and target. The within-category trials of the present 
experiments can be analyzed for typicality effects in a separate secondary analysis from 
the main analysis examining the categorical perception effect. 
Overview of Studies 
In two studies, we examined the effect of labeling on lateralized categorical 
perception.  As mentioned, the Gilbert et al. (2006) researchers made strong claims of 
Whorfian linguistic influences on perception in the left hemisphere, stronger claims than 
their data warrant. They did not test the effect when language was not explicitly 
activated, which is a crucial circumstance under which lateralized categorical perception 
should be found for the Whorfian habitual thought hypothesis.  In each of the studies, we 
manipulated the labeling of the color stimuli to occur before or after the task evoking the 
categorical perception effect. If the lateralized categorical perception effect for color is 
independent of a linguistic categorization context, i.e. habitual, the same pattern of 
reaction times should be seen regardless of whether the participants label the color 
stimuli prior to the task. In that case, the colors would be processed the same way, their 
perception activating the label of the color instantly, since Gilbert et al. (2006) showed 
that the effect depends on the availability of language. If instead the lateralized 
categorical perception effect for color is dependent on the linguistic categorization 
context, the effect should be more strongly seen when there is a before-task labeling 
procedure in contrast with an after-task labeling procedure. The linguistic distinction 
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would only have an effect when linguistic processing was purposefully engaged in the 
task. The comparison of these conditions allows us to make inferences that speak to the 
habitualness of the lateralized effect of language on perception. 
In Experiment 1 presented below, the visual search paradigm of Gilbert et al. 
(2006) was repeated, but with an added manipulation of the labeling procedure. Half the 
participants did the before-task labeling procedure as was done in the Gilbert et al. 
experiments while the other half did an after-task labeling procedure. This design allowed 
the idiosyncratic blue/green boundary of each participant to be verified in both labeling 
conditions while only priming color language and categorization in the before-task 
labeling condition. We expected to find the categorical perception effect to be stronger in 
the right visual field/left hemisphere than in the left visual field/right hemisphere and, 
importantly, for this difference to be larger and more reliable when labels were explicitly 
evoked before the task.   
Experiment 2 further tested the dependence of the lateralized categorical 
perception effect on context-driven language activation. The Gilbert et al. (2006) research 
group used color stimuli from two basic color categories in English. The colors green and 
blue have been ubiquitous in American college students’ lives from learning the colors of 
the rainbow in kindergarten, to being able to know what train to get on in a color coded 
subway system as an adult. The distinguishing of these color categories is required 
regularly in American society and the color labels are likely to be readily accessible with 
low activation thresholds creating a situation where activating the labels may be 
automatic for the average American college student, even without explicit priming. If 
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instead the color boundary being tested was not automatic, it would provide a better test 
of whether language is only optionally recruited into processing when the task context 
indicates that linguistic processing will be helpful. To avoid the basic level of labeling, 
the color stimuli were chosen from within the basic category green. The before-task 
labeling condition for this experiment distinguished two common sub-categories of 
green: sea green and grass green. Preliminary testing on a separate group of participants 
established the familiarity of the two categories used. These sub-categories are much less 
likely to automatically engage a language mode of thought in the visual search task when 
there is no explicit priming. In line with the hypothesis that linguistic processing is 
contextually cued rather than habitually utilized, we expected a categorical perception 
effect in the right visual field/left hemisphere only when labels were explicitly evoked. 
Additionally, in this second experiment, a sex variable was introduced to examine 
whether reaction times were influenced by the different average color naming 
competence of the sexes, as reaction times have been in other color stimuli experiments 
(Stroop, 1935). 
Experiment 1: Effect of Labeling on Discrimination of Basic-Level Colors 
In Experiment 1, we manipulated the labeling conditions to test whether explicitly 
categorizing the stimuli before the visual search task had an effect on the reaction time 
measure of categorical perception. We predicted that there would be a stronger 
categorical perception effect in the right visual field/left hemisphere than in the left visual 
field/right hemisphere and that the difference will be greater in the before-task labeling 
condition. 
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Method 
Participants. 
 Thirty-three Lehigh University undergraduates participated for course credit. The 
participants were native English speakers and right handed. The participants were 
screened for color blindness using the CITY test (City University, 2002). 
Design. 
 The experiment had a 2 x 2 x 2 Mixed Design. Visual field (left vs. right) and 
discrimination type (between- vs. within-category) were within-subject independent 
variables. The labeling procedure (before- vs. after-task) was a between-subjects 
independent variable. The dependent variable was reaction time measured from display 
onset to the button push indicating a color discrimination had been made. 
Additionally, just for the within-category trials, we conducted a test of the 
influence of typicality on reaction times. The color hues farther from the color boundary 
are more typical than the color hues that are closer to the color boundary. The typicality 
variable is part of a separate 2 x 2 x 2 Mixed Design. The typicality variable has the 
context color being either more or less typical than the target color, and the pair variable 
represents either blue or green. Typicality and pair are within-subjects variables.  
Labeling condition, before-task or after-task labeling, is a between-subjects variable. 
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Materials. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A 3-dimensional illustration of CIE L*a*b* color space. (Binder, 2010) 
 We chose four colors, two that English speakers generally call green and two that 
are generally called blue. The colors were created in Adobe Photoshop using CIE L*a*b* 
color space (see Fig. 1), with the intention of creating four color stimuli each with equal 
physical distance from its neighbors (see Fig. 2, the 2 greens, the 2 blues and the green 
and blue on either side of the color boundary all have the same physical distance within 
the pairs). The CIE L*a*b* represents a standardization of physical color space, 
encompassing the visual spectrum. The L* coordinate stands for brightness (the vertical 
dimension in Fig. 1) while a* and b* represent the 2 dimensions at each brightness plane.  
Saturation changes with distance from the center, creating rings of equal saturation, and 
hue is constant along a line radiating from the center point, changing as the angle of that 
line changes. 
  
  20 
 
Figure 2.The four color stimuli of Experiment 1.  The two colors on the left are generally 
called blue by native English speakers and were a within-category discrimination pair, 
the two colors on the right are generally called green by native English speakers and were 
the second within-category discrimination pair, and the two central stimuli were the 
between-categories discrimination pair. 
 
The brightness (L*) and saturation (square root of (a*2+b*2)) of the colors were 
held constant1 while the hue was varied by 13.5 +/- .5 units. The coordinates were 
calculated using trigonometric functions in Excel. The colors were then created in Adobe 
Photoshop by inputting the coordinates. Adobe Photoshop only recognizes L*, a*, and b* 
coordinates in integers limiting the level of precision of calculating equal hue variation 
between the colors, forcing rounding of the values to the nearest whole number. The two 
blues and the two greens (the within-category discriminations) were each approximately 
13.5 units apart from one another in hue, and the adjacent blue and green colors to the 
boundary were also approximately 13.5 units different in hue. Essentially, each 
discrimination pair consisted of two colors that are physically different from the other by 
the same amount as in the other pairs. The device-independent CIE L*a*b* colors were 
                                                        1 Brightness was held exactly constant by inserting the same number into Photoshop for the L* coordinate for each stimulus.  Saturation and hue co‐depend on the a* and b* coordinates.  Therefore saturation was not held completely constant but had a margin of difference +/‐ 1 unit. 
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then converted in Adobe Photoshop using its standard conversion tools to sRGB, the 
standard monitor color space, which is used by the computer to display the colors.  
Labels L* a* b* 
A — Blue 56 -9 -28 
B — Blue 56 -20 -20 
C — Green 56 -27 -8 
D — Green 56 -28 5 
Table 1. The CIE L*a*b* coordinates of the color stimuli in Experiment 1. 
Procedure. 
 In both labeling conditions, the main task was the visual search task developed by 
Gilbert et al. (2006). The key visual search display consisted of twelve color squares 
arrayed in a circle around a central fixation cross. One of the squares was a different 
color from the others. The participant was given the task of identifying which side of the 
display the different square was located on by pressing ‘a’ for the left side of the screen 
and ‘l’ for the right side of the screen. During the task, the participant had his or her head 
stabilized by a chin rest and was instructed to keep his or her eyes fixated on the cross in 
the center of the screen. By fixating in the center of the screen and responding to one side 
of the screen or the other, the participant was holding his or her visual fields constant and 
would initially process each side of the screen in different hemispheres. Through 
anatomical connections in the brain, the left visual field is initially processed in the right 
hemisphere and the right visual field is initially processed in the left hemisphere. Also 
with the aim to keep separate the initial processing of the two visual fields, a 200 ms 
exposure to the visual display was used to limit the ability of participants to move their 
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focus from the fixation cross.  In this time frame, it is possible that the first saccade 
would be made, and without access to eye-tracking equipment we could not verify that 
the participants were staying fixated, but this time scale was used in previous research 
that showed visual field differences. 
As with contra-lateral visual processing, the right arm is controlled by the left 
hemisphere and the left arm is controlled by the right hemisphere. The buttons were 
assigned so that no extra cross-hemisphere processing would be required. If the different 
stimulus were in the left visual field, the correct button would be ‘a’ which is located on 
the left side of the keyboard and pressed by the left hand. In the example display below, 
all external perception and action occurs on the left, and therefore would be processed 
and controlled using the right hemisphere. 
The sequence of screens consisted of the fixation cross for 1000 ms followed by 
the visual display for 200 ms followed by the fixation cross until a response was made, 
after which there was an inter-trial interval of 250 ms (see Fig. 4). There were 3 blocks 
consisting of 120 trials each for a total of 360 trials. Each block contained all three 
critical color contrasts, the within-category green discrimination, the within-category 
blue discrimination and the one-step difference between-categories discrimination, along 
with two non-critical discrimination pairs consisting of the two-step difference between- 
categories discriminations (referring to Fig. 2, the left most blue was paired with the left 
green and the right blue was paired with the right green). The three-step discrimination 
was not included. Each stimulus of each discrimination pair served as both the context  
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Figure 3. The sequence of screens during the visual search task. 
color (the 11 chips) and as the different color (the 1 chip), and appeared in all 12 
locations as the different color. The 5 (pairs) X 2 (each color of a discrimination pair 
serving as the context color) X 12 (locations) produces 120 unique visual search screens, 
each being presented once during each block. The one critical between-categories 
discrimination was displayed for 24 relevant trials per block, half in the left visual field 
and half in the right visual field. The two critical within-category discrimination pairs 
were the stimuli for 48 relevant trials per block, split between the visual fields.  The 3 
blocks resulted in a total of 72 between-category trials and 144 within-category trials per 
participant. 
 Half of the participants had the visual search task as their first task followed by 
the labeling task, while for the other half of the participants the visual search task was 
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preceded by the labeling task. The labeling task consisted of the four colors being 
presented as single squares in the center of the screen for 200 ms followed by a textbox in 
which the participants typed ‘green’ or ‘blue’. In the Gilbert et al. (2006) procedure, the 
participants only responded by pressing ‘g’ or ‘b’. We wanted to make the labeling more 
explicit, therefore requiring the full label to be typed out. Each stimulus was presented 8 
times for a total of 32 labeling trials. The labeling task preceded the visual search task in 
the before-task labeling procedure. It occurred after the visual search task in the after-task 
labeling procedure. 
Additionally in the before-task labeling procedure, color differences were 
explicitly referenced in the visual search task instructions. In the after-task labeling 
procedure, there was no explicit mention of color in the instructions. The key instructions 
in the before-task labeling condition read: 
“Twelve colored squares will flash briefly on the screen.  One of 
the squares will be a different color from the others.  Your task is to 
determine which side of the screen contains this differently colored square 
while keeping your eyes fixated on a “+” in the center of the screen.  The 
squares will be shades of green and blue. 
You will be making your responses with the keyboard.  If the 
differently colored square is on the LEFT side of the screen, press A.  If 
the differently colored square is on the RIGHT side of the screen, press L.  
The display will appear very briefly.  Please respond as quickly and 
accurately as possible.  If you are unsure which side contained the 
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differently colored square, just make your best guess and move on to the 
next trial.” 
The participants in the after-task labeling condition were given the instructions without 
the italicized and underlined portions. While this is a minor difference, the use of color 
language in the before-task labeling procedure reinforces the use of color language while 
the non-use of color language in the after-task labeling procedure serves to not indicate 
that there is a linguistically defined difference among the stimuli. 
At the end of the session, the participants were asked to verify their right-
handedness, and shown the CITY colorblindness test (City University, 2002) to verify 
self-reported normal color vision. They were debriefed and thanked. 
Results 
Eight participants were excluded from analysis: 3 for having correct response 
rates below 85%, 4 for having less than 3 of the last 4 labeling trials2 for each individual 
color stimulus correct relative to the experimenter-determined names, and 1 for no data 
being collected due to a program error. Twenty-five participants remained, 12 in the 
before-task labeling condition and 13 in the after-task labeling condition. 
A 2 x 2 x 2 Mixed Design ANOVA was run on the reaction time data from the 
one-step difference discriminations with discrimination type (between- vs. within- 
categories) and visual field (left vs. right) as within subject factors and labeling condition 
(before- vs. after-task) as the between subjects factor. Assumptions of the mixed design 
ANOVA were met.                                                          
2 There were 8 trials per color overall. Only the last 4 were considered, giving the participant time 
to practice and decide where the color boundary was within the four stimuli. 
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Figure 4. Reaction times as a function of discrimination type, visual field, and labeling 
task for Experiment 1. The error bars represent +/- 1 standard deviation. 
 
First we assessed whether the basic categorical perception effect was present in 
each condition. The categorical perception effect presents as faster reaction times 
between than within categories. From the means displayed in Figure 5, it can be 
determined that the between-categories discrimination was more quickly made and acted 
upon than the within-category discriminations for both the before- and after-task groups. 
There was a significant main effect of discrimination type, F(1,23)=96.309, p<.001. This 
indicates that collapsing across labeling (before-task vs. after-task) and visual field (right 
vs. left), the between-category discrimination was reacted to significantly faster than the 
within-category discriminations. This categorical perception effect was displayed in all 
conditions (all two-tailed paired sample t-tests had p-values of <.01). There was also a 
main effect of labeling condition, F(1,23)=6.621, p<.05. Collapsing across visual fields 
and discrimination type, the after-task labeling group had faster reaction times than the 
before-task labeling group. 
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We had predicted that the categorical perception effect would be stronger for 
before-task labeling than for after-task labeling, and that the labeling effect would be 
stronger in the right visual field/left hemisphere than in the left visual field/right 
hemisphere, a three-way interaction. There was not a significant three-way interaction of 
visual field by discrimination type by labeling condition (F(1,23)=.692, p>.05). No other 
interactions were significant. 
 
 
Figure 5. Within-category trial reaction times as a function of pair and typicality for the 
Experiment 1. The error bars represent +/- 1 standard deviation. 
 
An asymmetry of reaction times based on context color typicality was found. 
Using a 2 (pair) x 2 (typicality of target) x 2 (labeling condition) Mixed Design ANOVA, 
there was a main effect of pair, F(1,23)=24.269, p<.001, with green hues being reacted to 
faster than blue hues on average.  There was also a main effect of typicality, 
F(1,23)=9.300, p<.01, with the more typical color hue of a color pair serving as the target 
leading to a faster average reaction time than when the atypical member of the same pair 
was the target. There was an interaction of typicality and labeling condition, 
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F(1,23)=4.973, p<.05, represented by a typicality effect in the before-task labeling 
condition while there was not a clear influence of typicality in the after task labeling 
condition. There was a main effect of labeling condition, F(1,23)=6.674, p<.05, with the 
after-task labeling group’s reaction times being faster than the before-task labeling 
group’s reaction times. 
Discussion 
The main effects of discrimination type and labeling condition, with an absence of 
interactions between the discrimination type, visual field and labeling condition variables, 
constitute a different pattern than the results of the Gilbert et al. (2006) experiments. The 
categorical perception effect was present as expected, with the between-categories 
discrimination being reacted to faster than the within-category discriminations. The 
before-task labeling condition of this experiment followed the same procedure as the 
Gilbert et al. experiments, yet there was no lateralized categorical perception effect in the 
present results, only a categorical perception effect that was equally strong for stimuli 
presented in either visual field.    
This pattern of results suggests that there is no hemisphere-specific influence of 
processing occurring during this experiment.  Despite the previous research on lateralized 
categorical perception, portions of language being lateralized to the left hemisphere did 
not facilitate faster reaction times as a consequence of verbal and perceptual processing 
coinciding during the visual search task. The active recruitment of linguistic processing 
did not selectively facilitate processing in the left hemisphere.  The lack of an interaction 
of discrimination type, the indicator of the categorical perception effect, with visual field 
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and/or labeling condition suggests that the strength of the categorical perception effect is 
independent of these variables. This finding was unpredicted based on the previous 
research and surprising. 
Interestingly, the before-task labeling procedure actually slowed down 
participants’ reaction times independent of the visual field and discrimination type 
variations in the task. This result was also unpredicted and, in fact, counter-intuitive. If 
activating labels gives participants more information with which to distinguish the color 
hues, particularly on the between-categories trials, the straight forward prediction would 
be for the before-task labeling participants to be faster than their after-task labeling 
counterparts. Instead, the act of labeling the color hues prior to the visual search task 
slows down reaction times by about 40 milliseconds.  
Due to the lack of a labeling condition by discrimination type interaction, this is 
an effect independent of categorical perception. By labeling the colors prior to the task, 
the participants appear to be engaging a different mode of processing than if they had not. 
There is additional cognitive processing that is taking about 40 milliseconds to 
accomplish, but as to what exactly that processing encompasses, it is hard to say.  From 
the present experimental manipulations, we can suggest that it does not have to do with 
the processes underlying categorical perception as the strength of the effect holds across 
the labeling conditions, and that it does not have to do with lateralized processing since 
the visual fields were equally affected by the labeling manipulation.  
The typicality results interestingly were affected by the labeling manipulation 
where the categorical perception effects were not. The typicality effect was in the 
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predicted direction for the before-task labeling condition but was less strong in the after-
task labeling condition. The labeling manipulation interacted with the typicality variable, 
suggesting that active labeling of the colors strengthened the influence of typicality on 
the visual search response time. This was an exploratory analysis based on findings from 
a task that requires memory and incorporates more processing time into the task. If this 
pattern holds, it could reflect the influence of typicality, which is a property of concept 
membership, on processing occurring within 500 milliseconds. Only when labels were 
activated did category typicality have an effect, showing that there is an online, 
interactive component to visual processing on a short timescale. 
The color stimuli in this experiment were insufficiently controlled. The color hues 
were calculated precisely but the equipment used to produce the final colors displayed 
had a large amount of uncontrolled approximation and variation.  For this reason, the 
suggestions just discussed from the data patterns must be considered tentative. 
Additionally, the use of the blue/green boundary may not be the best test 
boundary for creating a non-linguistic condition out of the after-task labeling procedure. 
The participants could be spontaneously activating their color names due to their strong 
association with the colors, resulting in the equally strong categorical perception effect in 
the after-task labeling condition and before-task labeling condition. This would be 
consistent with the Stroop effect (Stroop, 1935) in which participants have trouble 
suppressing the color name for the color of the ink when reading an incongruous color 
word; the activation of the visual color name is stronger than the activation of the written 
color name. Experiment 2 was designed to address this point.  
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Experiment 2: Effect of Labeling on Discrimination of Non-Basic-Level Colors 
Experiment 1 was designed to use the same blue/green boundary that previous 
research (Gilbert et al., 2006; Drivonikou et al., 2007) has tested. However, the boundary 
does not provide a full separation of linguistic vs. non-linguistic processes on categorical 
perception. There was activation of the labels for the color stimuli in the before-task 
labeling conditions by design, but additionally, with a basic boundary for English 
speakers such as blue/green there was a spontaneous labeling process that did not depend 
on a language context, as shown by the pervasive and consistent categorical perception 
effect in the Experiment 1 after-task labeling condition. This spontaneous process 
potentially engaged the linguistic processing of the stimuli. Therefore, Experiment 2 is 
designed to use a non-basic color boundary as the test boundary in the same task as 
Experiment 1. Since there is less of a chance of spontaneous linguistic category 
activation, Experiment 2 has a greater possibility of reflecting perception independent 
from linguistic influence in the after-task labeling group – while still leaving room for a 
lexical influence on perception to come into play when names are explicitly activated by 
a before-task naming procedure. We predicted that there would be a stronger categorical 
perception effect in the before-task labeling group. Due to not getting a lateralized 
categorical perception effect in Experiment 1, we did not have a prediction of finding the 
lateralized effect but will test for it. Finally, we predicted a replication of the before-task 
labeling group having overall slower reaction times than the after-task labeling group. 
We added a sex variable to Experiment 2. This was to look at whether the average 
color naming competence of the sexes, particularly on sub-category boundaries, would 
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effect the reaction times, as it has in other experiments using color stimuli (Stroop, 1935). 
If sex were to interact with the other variables, it would be expected that women would 
have more of an effect of naming, with the naming tapping into more conceptual 
knowledge, than men. This would present as a three-way interaction of sex by pair type 
by labeling condition. If the lateralized effect to present in this experiment, a four-way 
interaction of sex by visual field by pair type by labeling condition would represent a 
difference in the strength of the lateralized categorical perception due to both labeling 
and sex. 
Pretest 
While the colors for Experiment 1 were calculated to be centered on the pre-
established blue/green boundary for English speakers, there was no pre-determined line 
within the category of green for the hues to be based around in Experiment 2. We wanted 
to use stimuli that could be divided by two labels reliably by a majority of English 
speaking students. Four hues were created with a constant brightness and saturation. Hue 
was varied evenly and the colors were all on the green side of the blue/green border. The 
initial hues were judged to be dividable into two groups by the experimenter and were 
then tested. 
Procedure. 
The pretest was run on a separate group of participants.  
The first pretest procedure began by displaying the four hues and required the 
participant to choose two color labels of their own by which to divide the hues. They then 
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did the same naming task as in Experiment 1 using the green hues and their own labels. 
The labels produced by the participants who were able to consistently label the color 
chips in such a way that they separated them along the central color boundary were 
analyzed for highest frequency. The first set of color hues tested on seven participants 
was not divided two hues to each label. A second set of color hues was created adjusting 
to the boundary that participants were using to divide the hues. Thirty-two participants 
were tested in this set. Approximately half of the participants used some form of sea (sea, 
seafoam, ocean, etc.) for the bluish green pair and about half used some form of grass 
(grass, forest, moss, etc.) for the yellowish green pair. 
Labels L* a* b* 
A - Sea 63 -55 7 
B - Sea 63 -53 17 
C - Grass 63 -49 26 
D - Grass 63 -44 34 
Table 2. The CIE L*a*b* coordinates of the color stimuli in Experiment 2. 
The next group of 20 participants was asked to do the same labeling task used in 
Experiment 1 and the first iteration of the pretest, but this time the participants were 
supplied with the sea and grass labels. The majority of participants (60%) met the 
naming criteria of less than 3 ‘incorrectly’ named. 
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Method 
Participants. 
 Sixty-eight undergraduate and graduate students at Lehigh University (32 female) 
participated in the main experiment for course credit or as volunteers. As in Experiment 
1, participants were pre-screened to be right-handed, have normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision, normal color vision, and consider English to be their primary language. None of 
the participants participated in Experiment 1. 
Design. 
 The experiment had a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 Mixed Design. Visual field (left vs. right) and 
discrimination type (between- vs. within-category) were within-subject independent 
variables. The labeling procedure (before- vs. after-task), and sex (male vs. female) were 
between-subjects independent variables. The dependent variable was reaction time 
measured from display onset to the button push indicating a color discrimination had 
been made. 
 As in Experiment 1, just for the within-category trials there is a test of the 
influence of typicality on reaction times using a 2 x 2 x 2 Mixed Design. The typicality 
variable has the context color being either more or less typical than the target color, and 
the pair variable represents either sea green or grass green. Typicality and pair are 
within-subjects variables.  Labeling condition, before-task or after-task labeling, is a 
between-subjects variable. 
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Materials. 
 
Figure 6. The four color stimuli of Experiment 2.  The two colors on the left were 
pretested to be called sea green by native English speakers and were a within-category 
discrimination pair, the two colors on the right were pretested to be called grass green by 
native English speakers and were the second within-category discrimination pair, and the 
two central stimuli were the between-categories discrimination pair. 
 
 The color stimuli were calculated in standardized color space as in Experiment 1. 
The colors were created using more advanced equipment. Without a colorimeter, the 
colors displayed in Experiment 1 may not have been precisely the colors that were 
calculated when determining the CIE coordinates. Also, the computer monitor used in 
Experiment 1 was a basic low-end monitor that distorted the color stimuli on the screen 
by viewing angle. The use of a Spyder3 colorimeter and a Dell UltraSharp U4210 
monitor was implemented when creating the new stimuli. The CRT monitor used in 
Experiment 1 was replaced by a monitor which has in-plane switching technology that 
allows for a 180° viewing angle, allowing the color stimuli presented at different points 
on the screen to look like the same hue from the stationary perspective of the participant. 
The stimuli were calculated in CIE L*a*b* color space. Rather than initially using 
L*a*b, the colors were first calculated in CIE L*C*H° which is another standardized 
color space that has coordinates for brightness (L), saturation, a.k.a. chroma, (C), and hue 
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(H).  In this color space, brightness and saturation can be held constant by maintaining 
the same values in the L and C coordinates. Hue could be varied equally by adding or 
subtracting the same unit differences to a starting value. Thus, the CIE L*C*H° color 
space was easiest to work with while determining the colors used in the pretest.  The final 
coordinates were then converted to CIE L*a*b* color space (see Fig. 13 above). 
The color chips were created in Adobe Photoshop. Colors can be input into the 
program using CIE L*a*b* coordinates in a device-independent file. The file was then 
converted to be device-dependent. In Experiment 1, this was done using a generic color 
profile that was not specific to our monitor. Here a colorimeter was used to create a color 
profile uniquely calibrated to the monitor used in the experiment. The colors were 
converted using the monitor-specific color profile creating a JPEG image file. This 
process ensured that the colors were shown on the specific monitor as they were intended 
to be shown by the calculations.  Finally, the files were converted to bitmap format, 
which is the picture file type most easily handled by E-Prime 2, the experiment design 
software. 
Procedure. 
The procedure was the same as the procedure in Experiment 1 with one small 
exception: in order to strengthen the labeling manipulation, there was an additional 
shortened labeling task between the blocks of the visual search task, with each color hue 
being presented and named twice, in order to keep the labels activated during the visual 
search task. The participants were simply told that they would repeat a shorter version of 
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the original naming task between blocks with not further explanation for why they were 
doing the task. 
Results 
Two participants reported not being able to see the difference between the colors 
in the after-task naming condition and did not complete the task. One participant did not 
follow the experiment instructions. Another fourteen participants did not meet the 
accuracy threshold, which was lowered to 80% from the 85% threshold in Experiment 1 
to reflect the greater task difficulty during the visual search task with all green color hues. 
An additional eleven participants did not meet the naming criterion that 3 of the last 4 
naming trials of the main labeling task be correctly labeled according to the experiment-
determined labels.  Six participants from the before-task labeling group were excluded 
because they had two or more inter-block labeling trials incorrect, indicating that they 
were not maintaining a steady boundary placement throughout the experiment. One final 
participant had reaction times more than 2 SD from the grand mean. After removing the 
data from these participants, the data of 33 participants were analyzed below, 18 (7 
women) in the before-task naming condition and 15 (7 women) in the after-task naming 
condition. 
The reaction time data was analyzed using a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 Mixed Design ANOVA. 
There was a significant main effect of discrimination type F(1,29)=22.448, p<.001. This 
indicates that for the sea/grass distinction, the basic categorical perception effect was 
present. There was also a marginal main effect of labeling condition, F(1, 29)=3.868, 
p=.059, repeating the pattern from Experiment 1 of faster reaction times in the after-task  
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Figure 6. Experiment 2 reaction times as a function of discrimination type, visual field, 
and labeling task. The error bars represent +/- 1 standard deviation. 
 
labeling condition than in the before-task labeling condition. The three-way interaction of 
discrimination type, visual field and labeling condition was not significant, F(1,29)=.058, 
p>.1. An influence of the visual field of presentation was not found as in Experiment 1. 
The two-way interaction of discrimination type and labeling condition was not 
significant, F(1, 29)=2.084, p>.1.  
There was also a significant interaction of labeling condition and sex, F(1, 
29)=8.601, p<.01. Women reacted faster in the after-task naming condition than in the 
before-task naming condition while men reacted faster in the before-task labeling 
condition. The number of participants per group is uneven, particularly for the women.  
There are 11 women in the before-task labeling group and only 6 in the after-task 
labeling group. With such a small n this is not a very reliable test of significance.  
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Figure 7. The interaction of labeling condition and sex in Experiment 2. The error bars  
represent +/- 1 standard deviation. 
Using a 2 (pair) x 2 (typicality of target) x 2 (labeling condition) Mixed Design 
ANOVA, there was a main effect of typicality, F(1,31)=5.870, p<.05, indicating that 
regardless of the hue pair or the labeling condition reaction times were faster when the 
more typical hue was the target color in the visual search task. An interaction of pair and 
typicality was present, F(1,31)=10.466, p<.01, due to the greater influence of typicality 
on the blue pair than on the green pair which showed the opposite pattern.  Finally, there 
was a marginal main effect of labeling condition, F(1,31)=4.025, p=.054, again showing 
that the after-task labeling reaction times were faster than the before-task labeling 
reaction times. 
Looking just at the sea green data which follows the pattern of the Experiment 1 
results with a 2 (typicality of target) x 2 (labeling condition) Mixed Design ANOVA, 
there is a main effect of typicality, F(1,31)=19.873, p<.001, a main effect of labeling 
condition, F(1, 31)=4.245, p<.05, and a marginal interaction of typicality and labeling  
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Figure 8. Within-category trial reaction times as a function of pair, typicality, and 
labeling condition for Experiment 2. The error bars represent +/- 1 standard deviation. 
 
condition, F(1,31)=4.136, p=.051.  These results confirm the pattern seen with the blue 
and green hues in Experiment 1, that the more typical color hue as the visual search target 
leads to faster reaction times and that the difference is stronger when there has been 
before-task labeling prior to the visual search task. 
Discussion 
The categorical perception effect was present in Experiment 2. The categorical 
perception effect was not lateralized, was not affected by the labeling manipulation, and 
was not affected by the sex of the participants.  The categorical perception effect was 
steady and reliable across conditions. There was no hemispherically based facilitation 
found in the reaction time data. Language lateralization does not appear to have an 
impact on categorical perception, as in Experiment 1.  
The main effect of labeling condition was marginally significant, similar to the 
significant result in Experiment 1. Again, the before-task labeling condition produced 
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slower average reaction times than the after-task labeling condition, with a difference of 
about 50 milliseconds. As the labeling condition variable did not interact with the other 
independent variables, it is again hard to say what this labeling condition based reaction 
time difference represents in terms of changed processing. Finding the same pattern of 
the after-task labelers being on average faster than the before task labelers as in 
Experiment 1 lends itself to the conclusion that there is truly a change in processing 
based on the labeling manipulation, though we can only speculate as to what that change 
in processing encompasses. 
The sex and labeling condition interaction reflects a greater influence of the 
labeling procedure on females than males. This result is consistent with the Stroop (1935) 
finding of female participants having a stronger reaction to color stimuli than male 
participants. Particularly at the sub-category name level, the color words used in the 
experiment are likely to have better established concepts in women’s minds than in men’s 
minds. The sex-based interaction does not differentiate between a perceptually based 
attunement to color categories or an online influence of genuinely conceptual processing, 
however. It is possible that having more developed color knowledge attunes visual 
processing to perceptual distinctions along color boundaries and/or provides more clearly 
distinguished categories to call upon. That sex and the labeling condition variables did 
not jointly interact with the discrimination type variable or the discrimination type and 
visual field variables indicates that the sex based difference reflected in the two-way 
interaction does not affect the same underlying processes as categorical perception, 
lateralized or non-lateralized. 
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The typicality results showed a more complicated pattern than was revealed in 
Experiment 1. The typicality effect was in the predicted direction for the before-task 
labeling condition for the sea green hues but was less strong in the after-task labeling 
condition for the sea green hues, as in Experiment 1. The pattern of reaction times split 
by typicality was less clear in the grass green hue data. The pattern reversed, with cases 
where the color hue farther from the color boundary (which we considered to be the more 
typical instances) served as the visual search target producing longer reaction times than 
when the color hue closer to the color boundary (which we considered to be the less 
typical instances) served as the target.  The difference between the typicality levels was 
larger for the before-task labeling condition than the after-task labeling condition. One 
possible reason for this could be that the concept of grass green is a less developed and 
ubiquitous concept than the ones for sea green as well as green and blue.  If the 
participants don’t have a representation of a typical grass green color to activate and use 
to produce typicality effects, no typicality effects should be seen. Since there does seem 
to be something occurring with the typicality asymmetry in the grass green before-task 
labeling condition reaction times, it is possible that our expectation for what is higher vs. 
lower typicality was wrong and participants considered the color hue closer to the color 
boundary to be more typical than the color hue further from the boundary.  A follow-up 
test norming the color hue typicalities could resolve this issue.    
The labeling manipulation interacted with the typicality variable, suggesting that 
active labeling of the colors strengthened the influence of typicality on the visual search 
response time. This was an exploratory analysis based on findings from the two-
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alternative forced choice task that requires the use of non-perceptual memory and 
incorporates more processing time into the task. If this pattern holds, it could reflect the 
influence of typicality, which is a property of concept membership, on processing 
occurring within 500 milliseconds. 
General Discussion 
We conducted two studies to test the effect of labeling on lateralized categorical 
perception of color. In Experiment 1, the predicted pattern of results, a stronger 
categorical perception effect in the right visual field/left hemisphere in participants who 
explicitly labeled the color stimuli, was not found. An effect of labeling on overall 
processing time, but not on the strength of the categorical perception effect, was found. 
The influence of labeling on the categorical perception effect was explored further by 
changing the color boundary to a sub-category distinction in Experiment 2. It was 
reasoned that the lack of a labeling influence on categorical perception could be due to 
the accessibility of the basic-level terms even without before-task labeling. Again, there 
was no influence of the labeling manipulation or visual field on the strength of the 
categorical perception effect. The influence of labeling on overall processing was found 
again in Experiment 2. The influence of sex of participant on reaction time performance 
during the visual search task was only examined for Experiment 2. There was an 
interaction such that women who labeled the colors before the task were significantly 
slower than the women who did not label the colors before the visual search task, while 
there was only a small reaction time difference for the men in the two labeling conditions 
in the opposite direction. 
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Lateralized Categorical Perception? 
Labeling the stimuli as blue or green before making same/different color 
decisions in the Experiment 1 did not strengthen the lateralized categorical perception 
effect in Experiment 1 contrary to our predictions. In fact, lateralized categorical 
perception was not found to be present at all. Lateralized categorical perception was also 
not present in Experiment 2. Nowhere in the data collected in the present studies was 
there evidence that visual field had an influence on the reaction times of participants 
doing the visual search task. 
Previous researchers (Drivonikou et al., 2007; Gilbert et al., 2006; Roberson et al. 
2008) have shown a lateralized categorical perception effect using very similar visual 
search paradigms.  In the original Gilbert et al. (2006) experiments, there was no 
categorical perception effect in the left visual field/right hemisphere. In subsequent 
experiments (Drivonikou et al. 2007), a signature categorical perception effect of faster 
between-category discriminations than within-category discriminations was found in the 
left visual field/right hemisphere, though significantly weaker than the effect found in the 
right visual field/left hemisphere.  In the Roberson et al. (2008) experiment, strong 
categorical perception was present for both visual fields. Only by splitting the data into 
fast and slow responders did they find the lateralized categorical perception effect. Now 
in the present data, with a unimodal distribution of participant average reaction times, not 
even unjustifiably splitting the participants into fast and slow participants can identify a 
lateralized categorical perception effect in the data. The evidence of lateralized 
categorical perception has become weaker with each published experiment. Since null 
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results are harder to publish, the experiments like the present ones that set out to 
investigate the effect but do not find it are unlikely to be in the publication record.  
However, the data from the present experiments do not present an exact 
replication of the Gilbert et al. (2006) results in ways besides the lateralized categorical 
perception. The average reaction times for the before-task labeling condition of 
Experiment 1, the condition most similar to the Gilbert et al. procedure, are about 100 ms 
longer than the Gilbert et al. average reaction times. There were minor differences in the 
procedures: We had participants type out ‘blue’ and  ‘green’ rather than press ‘b’ or ‘g’ 
during the labeling task. Additionally, we used slightly different colors to exert better 
control over the perceptual distance between them, and we used a CRT monitor rather 
than a flat screen, either of which could have resulted in less discriminable stimuli in our 
study compared to the Gilbert et al. stimuli. Finally, we didn’t monitor eye fixation to 
ensure that the visual fields remained independent though Gilbert et al. did not do this 
either, relying on the short exposure time of the visual display. Somewhere in amongst 
these changes and the presumption of fixation could be experimental differences that 
account for our different results.  
Alternatively, in a more complex interpretation of the data, it could be claimed 
that a lateralized categorical perception effect due to language activation is present in the 
data. This argument rests on the developmental results of Franklin et al. (2008) reviewed 
in the introduction. Franklin et al. found that toddlers who did not know the color 
categories well had lateralized categorical perception with a stronger categorical 
perception effect in the right hemisphere. Perhaps this greater sensitivity to focality does 
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not disappear in adults, but in the adult lateralized categorical perception effect with the 
stronger categorical perception in the left hemisphere, the baseline without language is 
below the strength of the effect in the right hemisphere, and language not only 
strengthens the effect but strengthens it up to and past the visual advantage for the right 
hemisphere. In this case, our null hypothesis of equal categorical perception effects in the 
two visual fields/hemispheres does not actually correspond to the case of absence of 
language influencing responses. Perhaps the Franklin et al. results should be taken to 
mean that we should adjust the interpretation so that a lateralized categorical perception 
effect with a stronger categorical perception effect in the right hemisphere means absence 
of a language influence while equal or stronger categorical perception in the left 
hemisphere indicates the effect of language. 
It is unclear whether the present results reflect lateralized categorical perception 
not being as robust a phenomenon as originally claimed, a problem with implementing 
the key components of the Gilbert et al. procedure, or if the assumption of equal 
perceptual sensitivity of the hemispheres is a bad assumption. Further experiments that 
experimentally disambiguate these possibilities are needed,. 
The Effect of Labeling on Categorical Perception 
Categorical perception (non-lateralized) was found to be present in both labeling 
conditions of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. In Experiment 1, the participants were 
being tested on a familiar and ubiquitous basic color boundary. Many of the participants 
in the after-task labeling condition, the non-linguistic context condition, reported 
explicitly thinking about the color labels, therefore being in a linguistic context in spite of 
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the experimental manipulation. The manipulation may not have created a non-linguistic 
task for the after-task labeling condition as was intended. Therefore in Experiment 2, the 
participants were tested on a sub-category boundary. The sub-category boundary was 
familiar to the participants but not ubiquitously relevant in the participants’ daily lives. 
Fewer participants reported explicitly thinking of color names in Experiment 2, yet the 
labeling manipulation again did not produce a statistically significant change in the 
strength of the categorical perception effect.  These patterns of results appear to indicate 
that there is not an influence of explicit labeling on the strength of the categorical 
perception effect.   
Between the lack of a lateralization of categorical perception in these experiments 
and a lack of influence of the labeling manipulation on the strength of the categorical 
perception effect, the categorical perception effect itself was robust and of a reliable 
strength. If the first interpretation of the lack of lateralized categorical perception were 
correct, categorical perception appears to be a result of cognitive processes occurring 
early in processing in both hemispheres and it appears that recent explicit language 
activation does not have an influence on those cognitive processes. These results counter 
the results and conclusions of the original lateralized categorical perception research 
(Gilbert et al., 2006) that categorical perception for color depends on online activation 
and access to linguistic information stored in the left hemisphere. 
Alternatively, if the reason we did not get lateralized categorical perception in the 
present experiments was due to something about our procedure, getting a strong 
categorical perception effect in both visual fields, for both labeling conditions, in both 
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experiments without a lateralization effect shows that what can disrupt the lateralization 
effect and what can disrupt the categorical perception effect are different. 
Finally, however, if the third explanation for the lack of a lateralized categorical 
perception effect, that the effect is there and currently undetectable, were true, the 
categorical perception results of each hemisphere would be reflecting different 
processing, with the processing of the left hemisphere being affected by language. 
Unfortunately, without distinguishing between the possible explanations for the 
lack of a lateralized categorical perception effect, the explanation for what cognitive 
processes are underlying categorical perception remains unclear. 
Labeling Effects on Overall Processing Speed 
While labeling the colors before the task did not change the strength of the 
categorical perception effect, it did have an effect on overall processing. In both 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, the participants who labeled the colors prior to doing the 
visual search task were significantly slower on average than the participants who did not 
label the colors prior to the task. This was an unexpected and counter-intuitive finding.  
According to Gilbert et al. (2006), the facilitation of the response seen in the right visual 
field/left hemisphere for the between category discriminations is due to online linguistic 
activation. That facilitation is a reduction in reaction time for those trials, the opposite of 
the increase in reaction time found (regardless of discrimination type or visual field) in 
the present experiments. Rather than facilitate processing and responding to the visual 
search discriminations, explicit labeling inhibited or added to processing resulting in a 
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slower response time. Even though this finding was unexpected and therefore statistically 
less certain than a predicted result, it was replicated from Experiment 1 to Experiment 2.  
What exactly the slow down in reaction time due to  labeling for the visual search 
task reflects in terms of processing is unclear that this point. It appears to be unrelated to 
the categorical perception effect. Preliminarily, the effect does seem to be influence by 
the sex of the participant, at least in Experiment 2 where sex was a variable. Women were 
slowed down on average by labeling before the visual search task with men showing little 
difference, and what difference there was for men happened in the opposite direction with 
male participants labeling before the task having a slightly faster reaction time on 
average. One speculative cause of this difference could be the gender specific role of 
subcategory color labels. Women are more likely to recognize and use finer color 
distinctions than men and therefore are more likely to have label-based knowledge to 
bring to bear on the task after labeling the colors. This would indicate that the cause of 
the inhibitory labeling effect could have to do with stored conceptual knowledge, though 
not necessarily linguistic conceptual knowledge since there was no visual field 
interaction.  But again, this is speculative and more research is needed to locate the cause 
of the effect. 
Habitual Thought vs. Thinking-for-Speaking 
 The effect of linguistic context on the categorical perception effect was not 
present. The results from the experiments presented here, according to the logic laid out 
in the introduction, appear to support the Whorfian (1959) habitual thought hypothesis 
over the Slobin (1996) thinking-for-speaking hypothesis. However, the logic laid out in 
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the introduction followed from the Gilbert et al. (2006) inferences that lateralized 
categorical perception is a linguistically based effect. Yet, in the present experiments 
there was no evidence of lateralized categorical perception. Since there was no lateralized 
categorical perception, there is no reason to presume that the categorical perception 
exhibited by the participants in the current experiments relied on access to linguistically 
based processing, which was inferred by Gilbert et al. based on the lateralization of 
categorical perception to the left hemisphere which is language dominant.  The prediction 
supporting the Whorfian hypothesis in these experiments was built off an assumption that 
was not met and therefore the data do not support any version of the Whorfian 
hypothesis. 
 The only clear, or at least clearly inferable, effect of language in these 
experiments is the labeling effect in which before-task labeling slows down response 
times relative to after-task labeling. Although it is a context based effect, it is unclear 
given the lack of an interaction with discrimination type, our measure of categorical 
perception, whether the labeling effect is happening at a linguistically influenced thought 
level that pertains to the Whorfian hypothesis and the thinking-for-speaking hypothesis. 
The categorical perception effects found could reflect only non-linguistically based 
differences in ease of some color discriminations related to non-linguistically determined 
focal color regions. The increased reaction time in the before-task labeling condition 
could be something as simple as more active processes occurring without meaningful 
conceptual interaction—increased cognitive load.  Without further investigation, the 
nature of linguistic influences on thought remains an open question. 
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Within-Category Typicality Effects and the Conceptual influence on Perception 
 In a secondary analysis, we looked at whether there was a typicality-based 
asymmetry in the reaction time data dependent on which of a particular pair of stimuli 
was the target vs. the context color for within-category discrimination trials. For three of 
the four color categories, we found an asymmetry in the before-task labeling condition 
such that if the target color was more typical than the context color, the reaction time was 
shorter than in the reverse configuration. This aligns with the Hanley and Roberson 
(2011) results, extending their findings from a memory based accuracy categorical 
perception task to a more immediately perceptual task in the present visual search task. 
 This analysis contributes to the perceptual and conceptual processing debate that 
centers on the categorical perception phenomenon (Lupyan et al. 2010; Roberson et al. 
2008). The labeling condition variable interacted with typicality in the present 
experiments. Only when the linguistic categories were explicitly activated prior to the 
visual search task did the asymmetry based on typicality appear in the data. Since 
typicality is a property of category membership, it can be inferred that labeling the colors 
activated the categories more than perceptually experiencing the colors alone did for the 
non-labeling participants.  Furthermore, since categorical information had an influence on 
reaction time in the visual search task, clearly some aspects of linguistic/conceptual 
information was affecting perceptual processing. 
 To take this point deeper, comparing the two-alternative forced choice task of the 
Hanley and Roberson (2011) experiments and the visual search task of the present 
experiments, the two-alternative forced choice task is a memory task while the visual 
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search task is more basically perceptual. In the two-alternative forced choice task, 
participants are shown a stimulus, in this case a color, and tasked with remembering it 
over the course of a delay prior to being given two color options and asked which was 
identical to the original. Here the color must be stored in memory over the course of the 
delay and there is time for the color to be categorized and fully processed prior to a 
decision being made 15 or more seconds later. In the visual search task, the task is much 
more immediately perceptual. Here both of the color stimuli of a given trial are on the 
display simultaneously. They can be perceptually compared to each other in order for the 
discrimination between the target color square and the context color squares to be made. 
Yet, before-task labeling produces an asymmetrical typicality effect. Since typicality is a 
property of category membership, the implication is that categorical knowledge is 
influencing processing on a time scale of half a second. Furthermore, since the effect is 
strengthened by, if not dependent on, before-task labeling, it follows that the linguistic-
category-relevant context induces an interaction of the conceptual, categorical knowledge 
with perceptual processing. This cannot be a purely perceptual effect, one based on 
proximity to a perceptual focal, or most typical, color since it is not present when labeling 
has not occurred before the visual search task. 
Future Directions 
 The three explanations for the lack of a visual field and discrimination type 
interaction, (1) the lateralized categorical perception effect is not robust, (2) the current 
experimental procedure was flawed, or (3) the current presumed baseline of the same 
perceptual abilities across hemispheres is a false one, need to be disambiguated to 
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understand the relationship between online language activation and categorical 
perception of color. 
  The second explanation, that there was something different about our 
experimental procedure compared to that of Gilbert et al. (2006) that disrupted the effect, 
is most straightforwardly tested.  The procedures could be directly compared in the same 
lab, using the same equipment and the same experimenters to see if there is some small 
difference between the current experiments’ procedures and that of Gilbert et al. (2006) 
that reliably changes the pattern of results. The before-task labeling condition of 
Experiment 1 was intended as a replication of the Gilbert et al. main finding of lateralized 
categorical perception, but lateralized categorical perception was absent from the present 
data. Confirming the presence or absence of a lateralized effect through additional 
replications of the procedure will guide future research toward or away from the 
lateralized categorical perception phenomenon. Of particular interest would be testing 
whether the full word vs. initial letter labeling task disrupted the effect. The full word 
input was added to strengthen the word category activation but perhaps just 
acknowledging the categories quickly rather than fully producing the labels provides a 
stronger categorization context. 
 The complex theory that the left hemisphere categorical perception advantage of 
Gilbert et al. (2006) is a result of online language activation while the right hemisphere 
categorical perception advantage of pre-linguistic toddlers (Franklin et al., 2008) is a 
result of an uneven focality sensitivity is less clearly testable.  One possibility would be 
to test adult speakers of languages with few color terms on color category boundaries that 
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they are not familiar with, but are found in many languages using the lateralized visual 
search paradigm. A similar procedure to the adult test used in the present experiments 
could be used without as much influence of language, since the participants wouldn’t 
have relevant linguistic categories.  If a stronger categorical perception effect were found 
in the right hemisphere, that would indicate a new comparison baseline would be 
warranted.  
Any future research using the lateralized visual search paradigm should use the 
improvements that were implemented on the materials in Experiment 2, including the use 
of a monitor that more evenly presented the same color to a viewer from different points 
on the screen, as well as using a colorimeter to increase the precision of the color stimuli. 
Without these improvements, the Experiment 1 results must be taken cautiously, though 
the results being largely confirmed by Experiment 2 allows us to have a bit more 
confidence than the materials alone warrant. Future experiments should use the 
improvements to give their results more inherent confidence based on less sources of 
uncontrolled variance. 
 The surprising inhibiting effect of before-task labeling should be pursued further. 
Why would online activation of linguistic categories slow or add to processing? From the 
present experiments it seems that it is not a lateralized effect and does not strengthen or 
weaken categorical perception. Is it simply a result of the main task being the second task 
for before-task labelers? Would labeling colors not used in the main visual search task or 
naming stimuli from a completely different domain such as animals have the same effect?  
Since the effect was unexpected and we have little evidence of what the processing 
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difference could be there are many avenues to be pursued in order to understand this 
effect. 
Finally, following up on the typicality asymmetry for a perceptually based task is 
another important direction. As the typicality analyses were added post-hoc, typicality 
norms for the stimuli were not developed. The assumption was that the color stimulus 
further from the color boundary for each label was more typical, but that is a crude 
measure. As evidenced by the lack of an asymmetry for grass, particularly with sub-
categories, the location of the prototype within the category is ill defined. By norming 
color stimuli for typicality, more fine tuned distinctions can be made between very 
typical, somewhat typical and atypical members of a category, providing a more complex 
look at the dimensions of the effect. 
Conclusions 
 The lateralized categorical perception effect was absent from the present data. At 
the very least, this failure to line up with previous research raises a lot of questions. This 
research points to some possible areas where linguistically mediated categorical 
perception is not found, which can be as theoretically important as where the effect is 
found. However, the lack of clarity for what processes the categorical perception effect is 
reflecting makes drawing hard conclusions premature. Less ambiguously, the labeling 
manipulation appears to have an early effect on the influence of typicality on visual 
processing, indicative of a perceptual/conceptual processing interaction. Perhaps 
investigating the influence of online linguistic activation relative to the influence of 
typicality would be a more fruitful direction for examining the early interaction of 
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perceptual and conceptual processing, while work on categorical perception tries to 
understand what cognitive processes are at work in the phenomenon. 
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